

AD69680

A PROPOSAL FOR ANALYZING THE PROCESS OF
DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Marshall W. Wiley

Reproduced by the
CLEARINGHOUSE
for Federal Scientific & Technical
Information, Springfield, Va. 22151

November 1969

D D C
DISSEMINATED
NOV 21 1969
REFUGEE
B

This document has been approved
for public release and its distribution
is unclassified

P-4100

A PROPOSAL FOR ANALYZING THE PROCESS OF
DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Marshall W. Wiley*

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

I

The processes by which decisions are reached in the field of foreign affairs have received surprisingly little attention in view of their central importance to our national security and their direct bearing on the lives of all Americans. In contrast to the amount we spend for the instruments of foreign policy (Defense establishment, AID, the Intelligence agencies), we have devoted very few resources to the understanding and improvement of the brain of the foreign affairs establishment -- the all-important decision-making processes that control the use of these expensive resources and whose mis-dgments could vitally affect our security and well-being.

The decision-making system is a complex, hierarchical network of individuals, with the president and his senior advisors at the apex, who interact in ways that are both complex and little understood. The cast of participants changes constantly and circumstances normally require that much of the process be conducted behind a veil of secrecy. The participants themselves are often unaware of the role played by other participants in arriving at a particular decision. Individual participation is determined by a variety of factors including formal position in the hierarchy, expertise or technical knowledge, or a personal relationship of trust and confidence with a senior decision-maker. Other factors, such as fear of press leaks and bureaucratic politics, may operate to include or exclude certain individuals at particular points in time.

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reproduced by The RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff.

The system converts a bewildering variety of information into specific courses of action in the light of the concerns and value judgments of a large number of individuals both inside and outside the government. The complexity and constantly changing nature of the system create formidable obstacles to the analysis and understanding of its processes.

In addition to the complexity of the system and the secrecy with which its operations are conducted, there are several other reasons for our apparent reluctance to devote additional resources to the understanding and improvement of the system's operations. In any political system, the power to make decisions is an important prize for success in the political struggle. A political leader who gains this prize and has the authority to make decisions will wish to maintain his freedom to consult whomever he desires and judge for himself when he has an array of recommendations and information adequate for his purposes. Dean Rusk described the Presidential decision-making system as "the flow of confidence" from the President downward through the hierarchy and pointed out that it would be too embarrassing to put these relationships on an organizational chart.¹ Any president or political leader would be skeptical of changes in the decision-making system that might tend to limit his freedom of action in exercising the authority of his office.

Rather than addressing the problem of how decision-making could be improved, the literature in this field has emphasized the problems faced by presidents in acquiring and exercising control over the federal bureaucracy.² Congressmen and senior appointive officials oppose changes in the decision-making system that tend to lessen their political leverage by reducing their power over certain specific issues. Many individuals both within the government and outside the government who are relatively satisfied with the decisions now being produced by the existing system fear that a change in the system would

¹Life, January 17, 1969, p. 62-B.

²Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, New York: John Wiley, 1964.

produce policy outcomes less satisfactory to them. In the light of these considerations, the full cooperation and support of the senior decision-makers would obviously be needed to carry out a serious analysis of the system's operations.

II

Some would argue that the existing system is the best that can be realistically expected, given our constitutional system and political environment. Many who have served in official positions in the policy-making process are convinced, however, that the existing system has serious defects that will probably become even more serious with the passage of time unless our priorities are shifted so as to allocate more resources to the analysis and improvement of the decision-making processes.

Since World War II, U.S. involvement in the affairs of other nations has vastly increased. Despite the current reaction to the Vietnam involvement, the trend is not likely to be reversed. The spread of industrialization and technological advances in transportation, communications, and the weapons of war have deepened and made more complex our involvement with other states.

Henry A. Kissinger describes the new situation as follows: "The revolutionary character of our age can be summed up in three general statements: (a) the number of participants in the international order has increased and their nature altered; (b) their technical ability to affect each other has vastly grown; (c) the scope of their purposes has expanded."³ In order to deal with this complexity we have added new agencies to the foreign affairs community of the U.S. Government, and we have vastly increased the foreign responsibilities of a variety of existing agencies. For the most part, these new responsibilities were allocated along functional lines. Effective coordination of foreign affairs policy-making among the various concerned agencies

³ Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," Agenda for the Nation, The Brookings Institute, 1968.

has been a constant problem. Although attempts have been made to increase the coordinating authority of the State Department, it has never had the power to force decisions on Defense, Treasury, Agriculture, or other well-established elements of the Washington bureaucracy in those cases where State's judgment was disputed. In addition to carrying the burden of the most important decisions, the White House has been obliged to resolve issues of lesser importance on which the bureaucracy is unable to agree. During the Johnson Administration the White House specified a growing list of subjects on which it reserved the right to make the final judgments. This list included all new PL-480 programs and all DLF loans above a fixed (and relatively small) figure. Although these practices may have preserved the President's options by keeping him involved in the details of decision-making, it placed a heavy burden of coordination on the President and the relatively small White House staff. It also reduced the time available for intermediate and longer range planning at the White House level.

The decision-making system is thus burdened by two apparently irreversible trends: (1) the information relevant to a particular decision and the concepts required to translate information into action have become increasingly complex and, in many cases, technical; (2) the number of individuals, government agencies, or private organizations who have an interest or concern in a particular decision area has greatly increased. In commenting on these trends, Henry A. Kissinger wrote, "The gap between experts and decision-makers is widening. The decision-maker rarely has as many hours to study a problem as the expert has years. Decisions may reflect an attempt to ward off conflicting pressures rather than a clear conception of long-range purposes."⁴ The changes made in the decision-making system since World War II have been inadequate to accommodate the increasing demands placed upon it. As a result, the burden of coordination has greatly increased at the highest levels and the senior decision-makers have been forced to react to short-range considerations, immediate pressures, and short-run objectives.

⁴Henry A. Kissinger, *ibid.*

Decision-making has tended to become a process of "on line" reactions to incoming cables. The senior decision-makers concern themselves with a multiplicity of specific details in a constant atmosphere of crisis. This mode of behavior has a little recognized but very significant cost: The more time the leadership spends on the details of specific decisions the less time it has for the difficult and important tasks of formulating the intermediate and longer range purposes of our national effort and examining critically the assumptions which underlie the immediate decisions. Shorthand phrases are substituted for longer range purposes. We act in order to "protect our prestige," "discourage aggression," or "win an unconditional surrender" and our senior leadership has inadequate opportunity to examine the validity and relevance of these shorthand expressions to our longer range national purposes.

James C. Thompson, who served in both the White House and the Department of State during the period when many important decisions were made covering our policy in Vietnam, described another cost of placing this heavy burden of specific decision-making on our senior officials. "A recurrent and increasingly important factor in the decision-making process was the banishment of real expertise. Here the underlying cause was the 'closed politics' of policy-making as issues become hot: The more sensitive the issue and the higher it rises in the bureaucracy, the more completely the experts are excluded while harassed senior generalists take over (that is, the Secretaries, the Under Secretaries, and Presidential Assistants). The frantic skimming of briefing papers in the back seats of limousines is no substitute for the presence of specialists; furthermore, in times of crisis such papers are deemed 'too sensitive' even for review by the specialists."⁵

The Johnson Administration has been particularly criticized for reacting to immediate problems with inadequate coordination and

⁵ James C. Thompson, Jr., "How Could Vietnam Happen?"; The Atlantic, April 1968.

forward planning.⁶ It is ironic that Walt Rostow, who was in a key position for organizing the decision-making process during the latter part of the Johnson Administration, clearly identified this weakness in previous administrations but was unable to bring about significant changes after assuming office. In 1960, prior to joining the White House staff, Rostow wrote, "Policy-making has consisted in a progression of reactions to major crises. Having failed to define, to anticipate and to deal with forces loose in the world, having tried merely to keep the great machine of government ticking over from day to day in the face of issues even operators could not ignore, at last the problems either never recognized or swept under the rug came ticking in over the incoming cables. Thus, at last, the reality of the matter was recognized, but at a time when options were narrowed. Emergency efforts -- often bypassing all the bureaucratic machinery created to deal with national affairs -- were hastily launched; and those became the working norms of policy until the next crisis came along. At a first approximation, it is quite accurate to say of any moment over the period 1940-1958 that current military and foreign policy was a bureaucratized version of that created ad hoc to deal with the last crisis."⁷

The organizational response to the June 1967, Middle East crisis demonstrated that the criticism Rostow directed against previous administrations was equally applicable to the one in which he served. The possibility of an outbreak of hostilities between the Arabs and Israelis had been clearly foreseen for some time, but when the event became imminent, the decision-making system was radically and suddenly altered by the creation of high-level task forces and other working groups who were given operational responsibilities in the decision-making processes. The system as it had existed prior to these changes ceased to function, and a new system was forged in the heat of the

⁶ Henry A. Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, January 1969, Vol. 47, No. 2, contains a trenchant analysis of the inadequate coordination of our military and political objectives in Viet Nam.

⁷ W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, Harper and Row, New York, 1960, pp. 499-500.

crisis. Individuals who had been a part of the old system were left in doubt concerning their roles in the new system and, perhaps even more important, they were left in doubt concerning the roles played by others. Of course, some formal allocation of function was made and various individuals were assigned to work on certain committees or task forces. In any organization, however, such formal designations are only the visible tip of the iceberg. A complex network of informal relationships is crucial in the functioning of a governmental decision-making system. As a result of these sudden changes, the informal working relationships were disrupted at the very time when their effective functioning was most crucial.

The decision-making center of gravity will inevitably and properly rise upwards within a hierarchy during crisis situations. A well-organized system should be able to accommodate such shifts in the locus of decision-making with as little disruption to the overall systems as possible and with minimum dilution of the input of lower-level expertise. Major organizational changes in the decision-making system during a crisis period should be avoided to the extent possible by better organizational design prior to the crisis.

The Foreign Service professionals recently added their voices to those concerned about the organizational problems of the foreign affairs community.⁸ The Chairman of the American Foreign Service Association, Lannon Walker, went so far as to refer to the foreign affairs machinery as an "antiorganization."⁹ Concern for these organizational and management problems has also appeared in a number of recent books written by individuals with varying degrees of prior experience as insiders in the decision system.¹⁰ The Senate's

⁸ Toward a Modern Diplomacy, American Foreign Service Association, Washington, D. C., 1968.

⁹ Lannon Walker, "Our Foreign Affairs Machinery: Time for an Overhaul," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2, January 1969.

¹⁰ James L. McCamy, Conduct of the New Diplomacy, Harper and Row, New York, 1964; John P. Leacacos, Fires in the In-Basket, World Publishing Company, 1966; Robert E. Elder, The Policy Machine, Syracuse University Press, 1960; Ellis Briggs, Anatomy of Diplomacy, David McKay Company, 1968; Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, 1966; Smith Simpson, Anatomy of the State Department, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1967.

Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations has held a series of hearings and published a number of valuable reports.¹¹ The one clear message emerging from these various sources is that the traditional decision-making system is inadequate to present requirements. There is little agreement on how improvements can be brought about.

III

The history of the attempts to improve the organization of the foreign affairs community has been presented by other writers.¹² These attempts have usually been characterized by the creation of a special study group with a mandate to examine the problems and formulate recommendations for improvement. Some of the recommendations produced by these study groups have been adopted, and some rejected. Of those adopted, some have improved the system and others have had deleterious effects unforeseen by those who formulated the recommendations. In my opinion, this way of approaching the problem is inadequate.

Organizational renewal should not be viewed as a one-time affair. To keep pace with the requirements of the modern world, the organization must contain within itself the capability for constant renewal. Since all large organizations tend toward rigidity as a reflection of the special interests of the subsystems and the parochial concerns of the individuals within the organization, the impetus for renewal must come from the most senior levels of the hierarchy.

Private business organizations whose survival depends on their ability to perform better than rival organizations usually give the highest positions in their hierarchies to the managers who control the allocation of personnel and financial resources. The senior technicians may be represented at the highest level but do not normally have the

¹¹ The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level, Senator Henry M. Jackson, ed., Praeger, New York, 1965, and subsequent committee prints.

¹² John P. Leacacos, Fires in the In-Basket.

dominant voice. But the senior members of the foreign affairs decision-making system have viewed themselves primarily as decision-makers rather than managers or organizers. The exceedingly heavy burdens placed on the senior leadership perhaps make this inevitable, and it is unlikely that anyone carrying these burdens could devote more of his time and effort to organizational problems. But this is also a vicious cycle. As the decision-making burdens increase, the senior decision-makers have less and less time to devote to improving the organization of the system with the result that still heavier burdens are placed on the senior decision-makers.

The problem cuts deeper than the mere allocation of time and energy between the two functions by the senior officials. Herbert A. Simon, a leading authority on the theory of organizations and decision-making, wrote, "There is no reason to expect that a man who has acquired a fairly high level of personal skill in decision-making activity will have a correspondingly high level of skill in designing efficient decision-making systems. To imagine that there is such a connection is like supposing that a man who is a good weight lifter can therefore design cranes. The skills of designing and maintaining the modern decision-making systems we call organizations are less intuitive skills. Hence, they are even more susceptible to training than the skills of personal decision-making."¹³ Within the foreign affairs community there are undoubtedly valid reasons why the men "skilled in designing decision-making systems" should have a status in the hierarchy inferior to those who are "skilled in decision-making," even though the reverse is normally true in private corporations. It is clear, however, that the foreign affairs community needs a more adequate built-in high-level capability for organizational change.

IV

Another and perhaps more fundamental criticism of the previous efforts for organizational renewal is that they were preceded by

¹³ Herbert A. Simon, The Shape of Automation for Men and Management, Harper and Row, 1965, p. 58.

inadequate systematic research and analysis. These studies relied primarily on the testimony of various former participants in the system who had an intuitive grasp of how various parts of the system operate and could make useful commonsense judgments on how the system might be improved. This is a valid approach, but intuitive judgments tend to vary considerably from one individual to another. This approach should be supplemented by extensive and detailed objective research on the functioning of both the formal and informal elements of the decision-making system.

The academic community has taken some important first steps in developing conceptual tools which could be usefully applied to the analysis of the foreign affairs decision-making processes.¹⁴ Some success has been achieved in developing theoretical models of decision-making behavior that possess considerable predictive value within reasonably well-structured decision-making environments.¹⁵ A well-structured decision-making environment exists when the goals of the organization and the means available to attain these goals are relatively precise, limited, and well understood by the decision-makers.

This type of environment exists to a considerably greater extent for the decision-maker in a private business firm than it does for the decision-maker in foreign affairs who must deal with a much broader range of ambiguous and intangible factors. Nevertheless, the critical importance of foreign affairs decision-making has motivated some analysts to concentrate their efforts on the more difficult task of analyzing the foreign affairs decision-making system.

Pioneering work in developing a foreign affairs decision-making model was done by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin who attempted to analyze and classify the factors involved in the

¹⁴ For a comprehensive overview of this new discipline see the introduction to the Handbook of Organizations, James G. March, ed., Rand McNally, Chicago, 1965.

¹⁵ Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963.

decision to resist aggression in Korea.¹⁶ Richard E. Neustadt's analysis of President Truman's decisions during the Korean War draws on similar theoretical concepts in analyzing the President's relationship to Congress and to certain elements of the Executive Branch.¹⁷ Roger Hilsman presented a conflict-consensus model in an interim foreign policy research report published in 1959.¹⁸

More recently, attempts have been made to apply the theoretical decision-making models developed by economists and psychologists to increase our understanding of the foreign affairs decision-making processes. Two of these attempts, published as Ph.D. theses in early 1968, are particularly promising.¹⁹ Each adds to our knowledge of the decision-making processes by applying several alternative models to a specific decision area. Allison analyzed the decision-making processes during the Cuban missile crisis by applying successively the model which assumes a unitary national actor, the model which looks primarily to the organizational outputs of the principal organizations concerned with foreign policy, and the model which focuses on the competitive interplay of the bureaucratic organizations within the decision-making process. Steinbruner applied four different models in analyzing the behavior of the advocates of a multilateral force as

¹⁶ Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1962. Although useful in focusing attention on the decision-making process, these studies were of limited theoretical value since no attempt was made to develop concepts relating the various factors into a coherent pattern.

¹⁷ Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, John E. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1964.

¹⁸ Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 4, December 1959.

¹⁹ Graham Tillet Allison, Jr., Policy, Process, and Politics: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ph.D. thesis presented to the Department of Government of Harvard University, January 1968, Abstract published at The RAND Corporation, P-3919, August 1968; John David Steinbruner, The Mind and Milieu of Policy Makers: A Case Study of the MLF, Ph.D. thesis presented to the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 1968.

the answer to the problem of sharing our nuclear weapons capability with our NATO allies. He used successively the basic rational model (development of all possible alternatives, and selection of the single alternative which will achieve the desired goal at least cost), the modified basic rational model (the basic rational model modified to conform with the realities faced by most decision-makers, i.e., limited time and resources to develop alternatives with consequent emphasis on satisfactory rather than optimal solutions), the model which focuses on the bargaining and bureaucratic politics which underlie foreign affairs decision-making, and the cognitive processing model which draws on recent research in psychology concerning the way in which men process information to establish patterns of belief and the psychological mechanisms used to maintain consistency in these belief patterns. These two studies point the way to an expanded program of research that could add significantly to our understanding of the decision-making system and thus prepare the way for specific improvements in the system.

v

The foregoing suggests two approaches to the improvement of decision-making in foreign affairs. First, we need a stronger commitment and an improved capability for organizational change²⁰ at a high level of the decision-making system. Second, we need an expanded program of fundamental research on the decision-making processes employing the concepts made available to us by recent advances in the social sciences.

A commitment for organizational change is primarily a matter of attitude and perception of role on the part of the senior decision-makers. Any change in administration provides obvious opportunities for new attitudes and perceptions as new men come into office and work out their own operational styles. A program of research and analysis would assist the new office holders in approaching these complex problems.

To a certain extent, the senior decision-makers affect the organization of the decision-making system by the way they perform their

²⁰The term "organizational change" is used in this paper to signify a broad range of innovation, and it is not limited to mere structural modification in the organization.

duties -- the people they consult, the clearances they obtain, the extent to which they establish effective two-way communications with their seniors and subordinates, and the extent to which they use existing authority. Somewhat more drastic changes in the system could be brought about by the White House acting on the basis of existing legislation. More fundamental reorganization would require Congressional action. An improved capability for change would require at the minimum (1) a group of people with a continuing responsibility for critically examining the operation of the system; (2) the means to employ technical expertise and modern social science concepts in conducting this examination; (3) a position within the governmental hierarchy with sufficient status to assure that their views and recommendations will receive appropriate consideration by the men ultimately responsible for the organization of the system; and (4) sufficient sophistication concerning the workings of the political process to be effective in influencing the attitudes and role-perceptions of the senior decision-makers.

VI

A process of organizational change requires criteria for judging possible alternative decision-making systems. The following is suggested: (1) Does the system provide an effective channel for all appropriate information and value inputs? (These include intelligence, foreign area expertise, domestic political considerations, bureaucratic political considerations, technical expertise, relationship to other national values and other policy choices.) (2) Is there an adequate capability for the development and examination of alternative courses of action? (3) Can decisions be reached in time to avoid the loss of opportunities? (4) Are decisions properly related to soundly conceived national purposes as established by the political leadership?

Although these four criteria would be useful in assessing the benefits received from specific changes in the decision system, they do not take into account the costs of such changes. At some point, the cost of improving the decision system as measured by these four

criteria becomes greater than the benefits received. The most important of these costs are the opportunity costs imposed on senior decision-makers who must carefully ration their time among many competing claims upon it. The financial costs would normally be small in proportion to the benefits of improved decision-making, but the political costs might be high if important participants in the political system perceive that their interests are being jeopardized.

Changes in the system may have a positive effect when measured by one of the four criteria but a negative effect when measured by another. For example, increasing its capability to develop and examine alternatives may reduce the timeliness of decisions. Recommendations for improvement must therefore be based on a series of estimated cost/benefit tradeoffs and benefit/benefit tradeoffs.

VII

New institutional arrangements are needed to coordinate the required research effort and serve as the advocate of organizational change. These responsibilities are now shared among the various Executive Departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and certain Congressional committees. The academic community has conducted some research on problems of governmental organization but, for several reasons, has been unable to carry out a sustained program of research on foreign affairs decision-making. Among these are the difficulty of obtaining access to the relevant information and the inadequacy of the existing conceptual apparatus.²¹

Without reducing the authority of existing governmental agencies, the on-going responsibility for monitoring the operations of the foreign affairs decision-making system should be more clearly focused. The monitoring agency should also be responsible for recommending changes in the system whenever its shortcomings become apparent. It

²¹ Recent work in general systems theory may be useful in developing the needed concepts. For a general description of systems theory see Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, George Braziller, Inc., New York, 1968, and Van Court Hare, Jr., Systems Analysis: A Diagnostic Approach, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1967.

should also serve as a central clearing house to sift new developments in management technology and organization theory for possible applications to the foreign affairs decision-making system.

Such an organization could be created in one of three locations. It could be established in the White House as an adjunct of the National Security Council; it could be located at a high level of the State Department, the agency possessing the principal responsibility for foreign affairs; or it could be created outside the framework of the government as a nonprofit private corporation along the lines of the research and analysis "think-tanks" established by the Department of Defense.

If established in the White House, the new organization would have the advantage of being associated with the one and only office possessing clear and recognized authority over all executive agencies concerned with foreign affairs. An organization located outside the White House could acquire similar authority by means of a presidential mandate, but a White House location would probably be the more effective means of influencing the attitudes and role-perceptions of the senior decision-makers of the foreign affairs establishment. In time, however, the new organization could assume a semi-operational character that might be considered inappropriate for the White House.

If established within the State Department, the new organization would be most appropriately located within the office of the Under Secretary or the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. If the Department acquired a stronger voice in organizing the decision-making system, it would then have the authority to enhance its own capability for coordination and for fulfilling its function as the principal advisor to the President in the field of foreign affairs.

The third alternative, a private nonprofit corporation, would have the advantage of greater administrative flexibility and would be free of the inevitable parochial bias of any government organization toward its parent agency. It might also attract private financing or foundation support which would make possible its creation within existing governmental budgetary limitations. Its lack of direct authority over government operations might not be a significant disadvantage since

any such organization would need to gain the support of the White House in order to implement its recommendations. Like the "think-tanks" it would be free of governmental personnel restrictions and would thus be in a better position to acquire high-quality personnel as needed in its operations. This is a significant advantage since such an organization would require personnel with a certain type of experience, specialized competence, and good judgment. In order to provide a stimulating environment, it might be located in a university community or established as a separate unit in one of the existing "think-tanks."

Wherever such an organization is located, it should be staffed with Foreign Service officers, other persons who have had operational experience as participants in the policy-making processes, and individuals from the academic or business world who possess specialized experience or knowledge relevant to the work of the new organization. The latter category would include systems analysts, specialists in information handling and data processing, management consultants, organization theorists, and others drawn from the various disciplines of the social sciences who would be able to contribute to the basic goal of improving the organization of the decision-making system. Those who had previously served in policy-making capacities within the decision-making system would be the best judges of the feasibility of various alternative suggestions and would be aware of intangible problems and constraints not readily apparent to an outside specialist.

The new organization would need a relatively small staff of four or five career government officials plus an equal number of noncareer personnel with relevant experience and training. In addition, the organization would need a small number of research assistants and a budget of approximately \$50,000 per year for consulting services. Secretarial and clerical assistance would also be required.

In addition to producing recommendations for the improvement of the decision-making process, the work of the new organization would have two important side effects. The research and analysis performed by the organization would add to our knowledge of decision-making in foreign affairs whether or not its recommendations were immediately accepted and implemented, and the career officials assigned to the

new organization would acquire a valuable training experience. The career personnel so assigned should be selected from those who have the potential for advancement to high-level positions. Such officers now have inadequate opportunity to gain experience in organization and management prior to their assignments to senior positions in which they are suddenly required to function in a managerial capacity. This may, in fact, account for some of the shortcomings in the present decision system. The information and attitudes acquired during an assignment to the new organization would help fill this gap in the present career assignment pattern. It would also have a significant longer range effect on the decision-making system itself as these officers over a period of time move into positions of greater responsibility. Their performance in these positions would undoubtedly be influenced by their previous experience in the new agency.